SCOTUS Clarifies Who is a Debt Collector Under FDCPA

By Stephen A. Fogdall

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibits a “debt collector” from using any “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,” as well as any “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”  15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f.  The critical predicate for liability under these provisions is that the party allegedly engaged in the improper conduct is, in fact, a “debt collector.”  It is well-settled that a party seeking to collect for its own account a debt it itself originated is not a “debt collector,” while an independent party in the business of collecting debts owned by others is a “debt collector.”   However, over the past ten years a circuit split arose regarding whether a party that buys debts originated by someone else, after those debts have gone into default, and then seeks to collect those debts for its own account is a “debt collector.”  The Third and Seventh Circuits concluded that such parties are debt collectors under the FDCPA, while the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits concluded that they are not.  The U.S. Supreme Court recently weighed in in Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc..  In a unanimous decision authored by Associate Justice Gorsuch (his first), the Court concluded that at least one part of the FDCPA’s definition of a “debt collector” excludes such parties.

The FDCPA broadly defines a “debt collector” as “any person” who (1) “uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” (sometimes referred to as the FDCPA’s “first definition” of a “debt collector”)  or (2) “who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another” (sometimes referred to as the “second definition” of a “debt collector”).  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6).  The statute then lists six exclusions, one of which is relevant to the Henson decision.  Specifically, this exclusion provides that the term “debt collector” “does not include” “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due . . . another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii).  This exclusion is discussed further below.

The Court in Henson addressed the second definition, the portion that applies to those who “regularly collect . . . debts owed or due . . . another.”  The Court specifically declined to address the first definition, the portion that applies to persons “in any business the principal purpose of which is to the collection of any debts,” stating that “the parties haven’t much litigated” this portion and it was outside the scope of the grant of certiorari.

Addressing the second definition, the Court fairly easily concluded that it excludes those who, like the respondent in Henson, purchase debts (even, importantly, after the debts have already gone into default) and seek to collect those debts for their own account.  Because the second definition by its terms refers to the collection of debts owed to “another,” it follows, the Court held, that the definition does not include those who collect debts for themselves.

The petitioners’ primary argument against this conclusion was that the second definition uses the word “owed” in the past tense.  Thus, according to the petitioners, a subsequent purchaser of a debt that was at one time “owed” to “another,” namely, the originating lender, would qualify as a “debt collector.”  The Court rejected this argument, noting that the word “owed” could easily be understood in the present tense, and, in any event, construing it in the past tense would be difficult to square with the nearby word “due” (“owed or due . . . another”), which indisputably is used in the present tense.

The Court then addressed the exclusion, alluded to above, removing from the definition “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due . . . another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii).  The Court rejected the petitioners’ suggestion that by excluding a person collecting a debt that “was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person,” the definition of “debt collector” impliedly included a person collecting a debt that was in default “at the time it was obtained by such person” (which allegedly was the case with the debts at issue here).

The Court concluded, first, that the term “obtained” in this exclusion does not mean “purchased,” but rather having taken “possession” of a debt “for servicing and collection.”  Second, the Court concluded that since the exclusion removes persons from the scope of the term “debt collector” who would otherwise fall within it, the exclusion does even not apply unless the person at issue does indeed satisfy the initial definition.  In other words, a person must, as a threshold, “attempt to collect debts owed another” in order for the logically secondary question to arise as to whether that person is within the terms of the exclusion.  The Court observed that the “petitioners’ argument simply does not fully confront this plain and implacable textual prerequisite.”

Although it is now clear that a party seeking to collect a debt for its own account (even when it acquired the debt after it had already gone into default) cannot be a “debt collector” under the second of the two definitions in the FDCPA, by declining to address the first definition, the Court in Henson left open the possibility that a party collecting  for its own account might still qualify as a debt collector if it is “in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).  Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit, after concluding, like the Supreme Court in Henson, that the second definition excludes parties collecting debts for their own accounts, expressly acknowledged that such a party might nevertheless be a debt collector under the first definition if its “‘principal purpose’ is the collection of ‘any debts.’”  Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309, 1316 n.8 (11th Cir. 2015).

There are comparatively few decisions analyzing the first definition, but that presumably will change in the wake of Henson, as plaintiffs, and their lawyers, seek to make use of this still potentially open path to attempt to establish that a debt owner is a “debt collector.”  Parties that purchase and collect debts for their own accounts should pay close attention as this issue evolves.  This blog will track and report on significant developments.

Third Circuit holds that only “material” representations by a debt collector are actionable under the FDCPA

By Stephen J. Shapiro

Joining a national trend, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that a plaintiff must allege more than just a misleading representation to prevail on a claim under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA). Rather, a plaintiff must allege that the representation at issue was “material” in the sense that it would impact the decision-making process of the least sophisticated debtor.

In Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, the attorneys for a debt collector, after obtaining a default judgment in a New Jersey state court against a debtor who failed to pay her credit card debt, served the debtor with a subpoena in aid of collection.  Under the New Jersey rules, an attorney may issue a subpoena in the name of the clerk of the New Jersey Superior Court. When the attorneys prepared the subpoena, though, they mistakenly used the name of a person who was not – and never had been – a clerk of the Superior Court.

The debtor brought a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging that the debt collector and its attorneys violated provisions of the FDCPA that prohibit those collecting debts from (a) using false, deceptive, or misleading representations to collect debts from a consumer, and (b) falsely representing that a document used to collect a debt is “authorized, issued or approved by any court …” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the debt collector and its attorneys on the ground that the misidentification of the clerk was not a material false statement.

On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, joining the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in holding that only material representations are actionable under the FDCPA.  The Court began by noting that the “least sophisticated debtor” standard governs claims under the FDCPA.  Under that standard, Courts “focus on whether a debt collector’s statement in a communication to a debtor would deceive or mislead the least sophisticated debtor.”  Whether the statement at issue is literally true or false is not determinative.  Rather, “debt collection communications must be assessed from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer regardless of whether a communication is alleged to be false, misleading, or deceptive.”  Therefore, the Court held, “a false statement is only actionable under the FDCPA if it has the potential to affect the decision-making process of the least sophisticated debtor; in other words, it must be material when viewed through the least sophisticated debtor’s eyes.”

Applying the materiality standard to the facts before it, the Court held that the misidentification of the clerk in the subpoena “could not possibly have affected the least sophisticated debtor’s ‘ability to make intelligent decisions.’”  As for the debtor’s alternate argument – that, by misidentifying the clerk, the defendants violated the FDCPA by falsely representing that the subpoena was authorized by a court – the Third Circuit held that, because attorneys in New Jersey are authorized to act as agents of the clerk when issuing subpoenas, the subpoena was validly issued regardless of the misidentification of the clerk.

* Joshua Won, Temple University School of Law Class of 2017, assisted with the preparation of this post.

The Third Circuit Limits the “Benign Language” Exception to the FDCPA Without Endorsing It

By Stephen A. Fogdall

Among other things, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits a debt collector from using “any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails.” (The debt collector may include, in addition to its address, its business name if the name does not indicate that it is in the business of collecting debts.) Some courts, such as the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, have read into this provision an exception for so-called “benign language,” and have allowed debt collectors to include additional phrases on envelopes such as “priority letter,” “personal and confidential,” or “immediate reply requested.”

In a recent Third Circuit case, Douglas v. Convergent Outsourcing, the debtor’s account number, while not printed on the envelope, was visible on the letter inside through a window. The court had to decide: (1) whether the account number was “on” the envelope when it was merely visible through the window, and (2) whether the account number was “any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address,” and thus prohibited by the FDCPA. The Third Circuit answered both questions “yes.”

As to the first question, the Third Circuit reasoned that “[l]ike language printed on the envelope itself, language appearing through a windowed envelope can be seen by anyone handling the mail.” Thus, such language “appears on the face” of the envelope and is therefore “on” it for purposes of the FDCPA.

As to the second question, the Third Circuit rejected the debt collector’s suggestion that the debtor’s account number was “benign language.” The Third Circuit “express[ed] no opinion” on whether the FDCPA in fact allows for such an exception, but held that even if it does, the account number was not “benign.” Rather, the court found, an account number is “a core piece of information pertaining to [the debtor’s] status as a debtor and [the debt collector’s] collection effort.” Because the account number “implicates core privacy concerns, it cannot be deemed benign.” The Third Circuit distinguished the types of language held to be benign by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits on the basis that the language in those cases was not “capable of identifying [the debtor] as a debtor.”

The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to offer guidance in this area. Until it does so, the best practice for debt collectors in the wake of this Third Circuit decision may be to assume that any language that might identify a letter’s recipient as a debtor, and which is in any way visible to a person handling the mail, violates the FDCPA and should be avoided.

Eleventh Circuit Holds That Filing a Time-Barred Proof of Claim in a Bankruptcy Proceeding Violates the FDCPA

By Christian Sheehan

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) provides that debt collectors “may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Nor may a debt collector “use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”  In determining whether a debt collector’s conduct was deceptive, misleading, unfair or unconscionable, courts apply a “least-sophisticated consumer” standard.

In Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the plaintiff owed roughly $2,000 to a furniture company, which assigned the debt to the defendant, LVNV Funding, LLC.  The last transaction on the plaintiff’s account occurred in 2001, and so, under Alabama’s three-year statute of limitations, the debt became unenforceable in 2004.  In 2008, the plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.  During the bankruptcy proceeding, LVNV filed a proof of claim to collect on the time-barred debt.  The plaintiff filed a counterclaim via an adversary proceeding, alleging that LVNV’s conduct violated the FDCPA.

The Eleventh Circuit held that a debt collector engages in deceptive, misleading, unfair, and/or unconscionable conduct (and therefore, violates the FDCPA) when it files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding to collect a time-barred debt.  The Court reasoned that the “least-sophisticated” debtor may be unaware that the debt is unenforceable, and thus, fail to object (as the plaintiff did in this case).  And if the debtor fails to object, under the Bankruptcy Code, the otherwise unenforceable debt is resurrected and will be paid from the debtor’s future wages, thereby reducing the funds available to satisfy creditors with legitimate and enforceable claims.

Prior to Crawford, several circuits had held that lawsuits to collect time-barred debts violate the FDCPA.  Crawford is significant because it extends the holdings of those cases to the bankruptcy context.

Third Circuit Holds that Consumers are Not Required to Seek Validation of a Debt before Filing Suit under the FDCPA

By Christian Sheehan

On June 26, 2014, in McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, the Third Circuit held that a consumer is not required to seek validation of a debt he believes is inaccurately described in a debt collection communication before filing suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

The FDCPA provides that if the consumer “notifies the debt collector in writing . . . that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt” and mail a copy to the consumer.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). Although the plaintiff in McLaughlin believed the debt collection communication he received was inaccurate, he did not seek validation of the debt. Instead, he filed suit against the debt collector.  The District Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the plaintiff could not bring an FDCPA claim without first disputing the debt and seeking validation from the collector.

The Third Circuit reversed, holding that to require the consumer to seek validation of the debt prior to filing suit under the FDCPA would be inconsistent with the text and purpose of the statute.  The Court observed that the FDCPA lists various consequences “if” the consumer disputes a debt, suggesting that the validation provisions are optional, rather than mandatory.  The Court further explained that imposing a validation prerequisite would frustrate the protective purpose of the FDCPA, and immunize misconduct by debt collectors based on a procedural nuance that many consumers would fail to understand. Finally, the Third Circuit downplayed the concern raised by other courts (which held that the validation procedures were mandatory) that the lack of a validation prerequisite would discourage the use of the statute’s validation procedures.  The Court explained that debtors will still have an incentive to utilize the validation procedures in order to facilitate the quick and inexpensive resolution of debt disputes.

In a TCPA case, Eleventh Circuit addresses who may give consent, how consent may be revoked and whether a charge is required

By Stephen J. Shapiro

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . to make any call (other than a call made . . . with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system . . . to any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service . . . or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.”

In a recent decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that:  (i) the “called party” who must give consent is the current subscriber of the cellular phone line; (ii) a person who shares a cellular phone plan with the subscriber may or may not, depending on the circumstances, have authority to give the consent envisioned by the TCPA; (iii) a “called party” may revoke consent orally; and (iv) a “called party” need not prove that he or she was charged for the calls at issue in order to prevail on a claim under the TCPA.

In Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., Clara Betancourt provided the cellular phone number of her partner, Fredy Osorio, on a credit card application. When Betancourt later became delinquent on her credit card payments, a debt collector hired by the defendant creditor made more than 300 autodialed calls to Osorio. Osorio sued the creditor under the TCPA, alleging that he had not provided consent for the creditor to call his cellular phone and, even if he had, he later orally revoked that consent during telephone calls with the debt collector. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the creditor, holding that Betancourt had consented to the calls when she provided the telephone number on her application and that Osorio’s alleged revocation was not effective as a matter of law because it was not in writing.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. On the issue of consent, because the TCPA permits calls to cellular telephone numbers “with the prior express consent of the called party,” the Court first addressed who qualifies as the “called party.” The Court held that the phrase “called party” means the current subscriber of the cellular phone line. Therefore, the Court concluded, the creditor had to establish that Osorio consented to the calls in order to avail itself of the TCPA’s consent exception. Because the parties had presented conflicting evidence as to whether Betancourt was authorized to consent to the calls on behalf of Osorio and, if so, whether she had in fact done so, the Court held that the issue of consent had to be resolved by a jury and that summary judgment was not appropriate. In so ruling, the Court rejected the creditor’s argument that Betancourt, as a matter of law, had authority to consent to calls to the cellular phone of anyone in her household.

On the issue of whether revocation of consent may be communicated orally or only in writing, the Court noted that, although the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) requires a debtor who no longer wishes to be contacted by a debt collector to notify the debt collector in writing, the TCPA does not contain equivalent language. The Court “presume[d] from the TCPA’s silence regarding the means of providing consent that Congress sought to incorporate ‘the common law concept of consent.’” Explaining that the common law concept of consent “generally allow[s] oral revocation,” the Court held that a “called party” may orally revoke consent for purposes of the TCPA. Since the parties disputed whether Osorio orally revoked any consent Betancourt may have given to call the cellular phone, the Court held that summary judgment on the issue of revocation of consent was not appropriate.

Finally, the creditor argued that, because the TCPA prohibits calls “to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call,” a plaintiff must prove that he was charged for the calls at issue in order to prevail under the TCPA. The Court rejected this argument, holding that, as a matter of statutory construction, “the phrase ‘for which the called party is charged for the call’ modifies only ‘any service’ and not the other terms” in the provision such as “cellular telephone service.”

Seventh Circuit Addresses When Offer of Settlement Can Moot Class Representative’s Interest; Holds That Dunning Letter Offering to “Settle” an Unenforceable Debt Violates FDCPA

By Theresa E. Loscalzo

In McMahon v. LVNV Funding LLC, and Delgado v. Capital Management Services, LP, two separate appeals consolidated for purposes of an opinion, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed both the circumstances under which (a) a defense proffered settlement can pick off a party plaintiff in a class action, thereby mooting the claims; and (b) dunning letters seeking to collect time-barred debts may violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

In McMahon, the defendant debt collector sent a letter to plaintiff setting forth the name of the creditor from whom the debt was purchased, the amount of the debt and an offer to settle the debt for about 50 percent of the amount of the debt. The letter did not contain any information concerning when the original debt was incurred, a detail that would have alerted a consumer or his lawyer to the fact that there was, in the court’s words, “an iron-clad defense under the statute of limitations.”  Similarly, in Delgado, the defendant debt collector sent a letter to plaintiff seeking to collect an old debt.  The letter contained an offer to settle the outstanding debt but did not contain any information concerning when the original debt was incurred.

Both McMahon and Delgado filed individual and putative class action claims alleging that the debt collectors violated the FDCPA by including “settlement offers” in collection letters for time-barred debts.

Relevant Procedural Background. In McMahon, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, and McMahon filed a motion for class certification.  The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the class allegations but on reconsideration, granted McMahon leave to amend the class allegations.  Hours after the district court granted leave to re-plead, defendant made an offer to settle plaintiff’s individual claim by paying statutory damages, costs incurred, a reasonable attorney’s fee, and “any other reasonable relief” if the court concluded more was necessary.  Plaintiff ignored the offer, and filed an amended class complaint and amended motion for certification.   Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that its settlement offer rendered McMahon’s individual claim moot, which made him an inappropriate class representative.   Holding that the offer to pay McMahon everything he would be entitled to recover under the statute mooted his claim, the district court dismissed the case for lack of an Article III case or controversy.

In Delgado, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court denied, holding that when “collecting on a time-barred debt a debt collector must inform the consumer that (1) the collector cannot sue to collect the debt and (2) providing a partial payment would revive the collector’s ability to sue and collect the balance.”  Defendant moved for interlocutory appeal, which motion was granted.

Mootness. Reversing the McMahon district court, the Seventh Circuit first addressed the issue of whether the settlement offer proffered in McMahon mooted plaintiff’s claims, and held that an offer to pay a plaintiff everything requested can render a putative class action moot only if the settlement is proposed before the plaintiff files a motion for class certification.  Because the time to re-plead his class allegations and move to certify had yet to run at the time of the settlement offer, McMahon retained an on-going personal economic stake in the substantive controversy and, therefore, could represent the putative class.

FDCPA. The Court then turned to an analysis of the circumstances under which a dunning letter for an unenforceable time-barred debt could violate the FDCPA.  Affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss in Delgado, the Court noted that Section 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA specifically prohibits the false representation of the character or legal status of any debt, and  squarely held that a debt collector violates the FDCPA if it uses language that would mislead an unsophisticated consumer into believing that a debt is legally enforceable, regardless of whether the letter actually threatens litigation (as the Third Circuit and Eighth Circuit require).   The Court noted that where dunning letters contain offers of settlement, as here, it exacerbates the potential impact on the consumer because by making a partial payment in response to such a letter, the consumer could unwittingly reset the statute of limitations on the entire debt and thereby revive what had been a legally unenforceable claim.

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