Call Me by Your Name – Or Risk an FDCPA Claim, Says Third Circuit

By Stephen J Shapiro

What’s in a name? For debt collectors, the answer potentially is years of litigation according to the Third Circuit’s recent opinion in Levins v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group LLC.

In Levins, Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group LLC (HRRG), a debt collector, attempted to collect a debt from the plaintiff debtors. HRRG, which had registered to do business in New Jersey under the name “ARS Account Resolution Services,” identified itself as “ARS” in several voicemail messages that it left for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs brought a putative class action alleging that HRRG violated the “true name” provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), which prohibits debt collectors from using “the name of any business, company or organization other than the true name of the debt collector’s business, company, or organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(14). The district court granted HRRG’s motion to dismiss the claim.

On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the dismissal. The Court, adopting the Federal Trade Commission’s interpretation of the “true name” provision, held that the provision “permit[s] a debt collector to ‘use its full business name, the name under which it usually transacts business, or a commonly-used acronym[,]’ as long as ‘it consistently uses the same name when dealing with a particular consumer.’” The plaintiffs in the Levins case alleged that the acronym “ARS” is associated with hundreds of businesses, including an unrelated debt collector, and, therefore, was not an acronym commonly associated with HRRG. Given those allegations, the Court explained that “[n]othing in the information properly before us [on review of an appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss] indicates that ‘ARS’ is HRRG’s full business name, the name under which it usually transacts business, or its commonly used acronym.” Therefore, the Court held that plaintiffs stated a plausible claim for violation of the FDCPA’s “true name” provision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court noted that HRRG’s challenge to plaintiffs’ allegation that “ARS” was not an acronym that HRRG commonly used would have to wait until summary judgment or trial.

The Third Circuit did, however, affirm the trial court’s rejection of two additional legal theories that plaintiffs asserted. First, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that HRRG violated a provision of the FDCPA that prohibits debt collectors from failing to make a “meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity” when they call debtors. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6). The Court held that “‘meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity’ is not restricted to providing the name of the debt collector.” Rather, a debt collector that discloses during a call that it is a debt collector has made a “meaningful disclosure” of its identity under the FDCPA. Second, the Court held that, because HRRG’s messages adequately warned that it would use any information collected from the debtors to collect a debt, HRRG did not, as plaintiffs alleged, violate a section of the FDCPA that prohibits “the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(10).

In light of the Third Circuit’s holding in Levins, debt collectors should consider using a name registered with a government agency or bureau when they communicate with debtors. Doing so will enable debt collectors to provide the courts with a public record, which the courts may consider on a motion to dismiss, to establish that they used their full business name or “transacting as” name to contact the debtor. Using any name other than an “official” name evidenced by a government record carries risk because it opens the door for debtors to allege that the name the debt collector used was a not a “true name,” which allegation the courts will be required to accept as true on a motion to dismiss.


The Third Circuit Holds that Highway Tolls are Not “Debts” Under the FDCPA

By Stephen J Shapiro

Drivers who use New Jersey’s toll roads can pat themselves on the back because the tolls they pay help fund a public benefit. But, as the Third Circuit recently held, that fact also means that tolls are not “debts” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and, therefore, debt collectors seeking to collect unpaid tolls need not comply with the FDCPA’s regulations governing debt collection.

In St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., the plaintiff signed up for an E-ZPass account, which he used to pay tolls he incurred while travelling on toll roads in New Jersey. When the plaintiff’s E-ZPass account fell into arrears, E-ZPass assigned the debt to a private debt collection agency. The agency sent the plaintiff a letter demanding payment of the debt. The plaintiff’s E-ZPass account number and a “quick response” code was visible through a window in the envelope containing the collection letter.

The plaintiff brought a putative class action against the agency, alleging that it violated a provision of the FDCPA that prohibits debt collectors from including on an envelope containing a collection letter “any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8). However, the prohibitions in the FDCPA only apply to the collection of a “debt,” which the Act defines as an “obligation . . . of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). The district court concluded that a highway toll is not a “debt” within the meaning of the FDCPA. Therefore, the district court held that the FDCPA’s prohibitions did not apply to the agency’s collection efforts and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.

The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal. After reviewing previous decisions analyzing the issue, the Third Circuit announced a three-part test for determining whether an obligation is a “debt” under the FDCPA:

First, ascertain “whether the underlying obligation ‘aris[es] out of a transaction,’ – that is, a consensual exchange involving an affirmative ‘request,’ and ‘the rendition of a service or purchase of property or other item of value, such as a contract—or whether, instead, it arises by virtue of a legal status—that is, an involuntary obligation attendant to the fact of having a specific legal status . . . .”

Second, if the obligation arises out of a transaction, “identify what ‘money, property, insurance, or services . . . [] are the subject of the transaction, i.e., what it is that is being rendered in exchange for the monetary payment.”

Third, “consider the characteristics of that ‘money, property, insurance, or services’ to ascertain whether they are ‘primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.’”

Applying this test to the facts before it, the Court first held that the obligation to pay tolls does arise out of a “transaction” because a driver can voluntarily choose whether to incur the obligation: “[Plaintiff] would have no obligation to pay highway tolls had he chosen to use alternative routes or to keep his car parked . . . .” The Court next observed that the purpose of tolls is to “‘compensate the state for the cost, maintenance and repair of its highways,’” and that, in exchange for tolls, “all drivers benefit from ‘safer, faster, and more convenient travel in and through the State.’” As such, the Court explained that “what [plaintiff] receives in exchange for the payment of highway tolls is not the private benefit of a ‘personal, family, or household’ service or good but the very public benefit of highway maintenance and repair.”

Having concluded that tolls are not “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,” the Court held that tolls are not “debts” within the meaning of the FDCPA: “[T]he FDCPA is not implicated where, as here, the bulk, if not all of the services rendered, are made ‘without reference to peculiar benefits to particular individuals or property.’”

In light of the Third Circuit’s decision, debt collectors may want to consider factoring into their operational practices and pricing models the reduced risk of facing FDCPA claims when collecting obligations that debtors did not voluntarily choose to incur or obligations that primarily benefit the public over individual debtors.


The Third Circuit Holds that the FDCPA Applies to Debt Collectors that Are Collecting Debts They Own

By Stephen J Shapiro

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) regulates the conduct of debt collectors.  The Act defines a “debt collector” as (a) any entity whose “principal purpose . . . is the collection of any debts” (the “principal purpose” definition), or (b) any entity that “regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due . . . another” (the “regularly collects” definition).  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).  In a recent precedential opinion, the Third Circuit held that an entity whose principal purpose is the collection of debts is a debt collector even if it owns the debt it is collecting and, therefore, is not collecting a debt owed another.  In other words, an entity that meets the “principal purpose” definition is a debt collector even if it does not also meet the “regularly collects” definition.

In Tepper v. Amos Financial, LLC, a creditor sold a loan on which its borrower had defaulted to Amos Financial, whose sole business involved purchasing and attempting to collect debts originated by others.  The debtor sued Amos alleging that, during its efforts to collect the debt, Amos violated the FDCPA by making false representations about the debt in both its written and oral communications with the debtor.  After a bench trial, the district court held that Amos was a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA and that it actions violated the Act.

On appeal, Amos challenged the district court’s conclusion that it is a debt collector.  Amos argued that, because it owned the debt it was attempting to collect, it was not collecting a debt “owed or due . . . another” and, therefore, was not a debt collector.  The Third Circuit rejected this argument because in the “principal purpose” definition the phrase “‘[a]ny debts’ does not distinguish to whom the debt is owed” and the phrase “‘debts owed or due . . . another’ . . . limits only the ‘regularly collects’ definition.”  Because there was no dispute that Amos’ principal purpose was the collection of debts, the Court held that Amos was a debt collector under the “principal purpose” definition even if it would not also qualify as a debt collector under the “regularly collects” definition: “[A]n entity whose principal purpose of business is the collection of any debts is a debt collector regardless whether the entity owns the debts it collects.”

Amos also attempted to rely on the fact that the FDCPA does not apply to “creditors,” which the Act defines as entities “to whom [the] debt is owed.”  Amos argued that, because it owned the debt at issue, it was a “creditor” and not subject to the Act.  The Third Circuit rejected this argument as well, holding that “an entity that satisfies both [the definition of debt collector and creditor] is within the Act’s reach.”

The Court also noted that the Supreme Court recently rejected the test the Third Circuit previously applied when analyzing whether an entity that purchased a debt was a debt collector.  Specifically, in Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P., the Third Circuit, adopting what is referred to as the “default test,” held that “an assignee of an obligation is not a ‘debt collector’ if the obligation is not in default at the time of the assignment; conversely, an assignee may be deemed a ‘debt collector’ if the obligation is already in default when it is assigned.”  The Third Circuit explained that in 2017 the Supreme Court repealed the “default test” in Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.

In light of the Third Circuit’s ruling, debt collectors should remain vigilant about complying with the FDCPA, whether they are attempting to collect debts that they own or debts owned by others.


2nd Cir: Debtor’s Failure to Contest Debt Does Not Insulate Debt Collector from Liability under FDCPA

By Stephen J Shapiro

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) requires that a debt collector attempting to collect a debt notify a consumer that (1) “unless the consumer . . . disputes the validity of the debt . . . the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector,” and (2) if the consumer disputes the debt, “the debt collector will obtain [and send to the consumer] verification of the debt . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) and (4).  The Second Circuit recently held that compliance with these provisions does not insulate debt collectors from claims alleging that they violated the FDCPA by making false representations about debts.

In Vangorden v. Second Round, Limited Partnership, a creditor agreed to settle a debtor’s credit card debt for less than the amount the debtor owed.  Five years later, a debt collector purchased the debtor’s settled debt and sent the debtor a letter requesting that she pay the “current outstanding balance” on her credit card of about $1,300.  In compliance with § 1692g(a), the letter notified the debtor that she had the right to dispute the validity of the debt and that the debt collector would verify the debt if she did so.  The debtor did not dispute the debt.  Instead, she sued the debt collector alleging that it violated several provisions of the FDCPA by falsely representing the existence, amount and legal status of the debt.  The debt collector moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that the debtor did not exercise her right to dispute the debt, and the trial court granted the motion.

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.  Joining the Third Circuit and Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit held that “nothing in the text of the FDCPA suggests that a debtor’s ability to state a [claim under the Act] ‘is dependent upon the debtor first disputing the validity of the debt in accordance with § 1692g.’”

In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit relied in part on the FDCPA’s “bona fide error” defense.  Section 1692k(c) of the FDCPA provides that a debt collector “may not be held liable . . . if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of the evidence that [a] violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”  The Court held that, where debt collectors make honest mistakes, “the protection the FDCPA affords debt collectors . . . is the affirmative defense stated in § 1692k(c), not an immunity from suit inferred from the dispute notice provision of § 1692g.”

Practitioners can draw a number of lessons from Vangorden:  1) At least in the Second, Third and Fourth Circuits, debt collectors are unlikely to prevail on requests to dismiss FDCPA claims on the ground that the debtor did not contest the debt at issue.  2) Where the facts so warrant, debt collectors should plead § 1692k(c) as an affirmative defense to avoid potential waiver arguments.  3) Where a debt collector intends to invoke the “bona fide error” defense, it should make efforts to develop record facts to support the defense, since the burden of proof will fall on the debt collector at both the summary judgment stage and at trial.


SCOTUS Clarifies Who is a Debt Collector Under FDCPA

By Stephen A. Fogdall

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibits a “debt collector” from using any “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,” as well as any “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”  15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f.  The critical predicate for liability under these provisions is that the party allegedly engaged in the improper conduct is, in fact, a “debt collector.”  It is well-settled that a party seeking to collect for its own account a debt it itself originated is not a “debt collector,” while an independent party in the business of collecting debts owned by others is a “debt collector.”   However, over the past ten years a circuit split arose regarding whether a party that buys debts originated by someone else, after those debts have gone into default, and then seeks to collect those debts for its own account is a “debt collector.”  The Third and Seventh Circuits concluded that such parties are debt collectors under the FDCPA, while the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits concluded that they are not.  The U.S. Supreme Court recently weighed in in Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc..  In a unanimous decision authored by Associate Justice Gorsuch (his first), the Court concluded that at least one part of the FDCPA’s definition of a “debt collector” excludes such parties.

The FDCPA broadly defines a “debt collector” as “any person” who (1) “uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” (sometimes referred to as the FDCPA’s “first definition” of a “debt collector”)  or (2) “who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another” (sometimes referred to as the “second definition” of a “debt collector”).  15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6).  The statute then lists six exclusions, one of which is relevant to the Henson decision.  Specifically, this exclusion provides that the term “debt collector” “does not include” “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due . . . another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii).  This exclusion is discussed further below.

The Court in Henson addressed the second definition, the portion that applies to those who “regularly collect . . . debts owed or due . . . another.”  The Court specifically declined to address the first definition, the portion that applies to persons “in any business the principal purpose of which is to the collection of any debts,” stating that “the parties haven’t much litigated” this portion and it was outside the scope of the grant of certiorari.

Addressing the second definition, the Court fairly easily concluded that it excludes those who, like the respondent in Henson, purchase debts (even, importantly, after the debts have already gone into default) and seek to collect those debts for their own account.  Because the second definition by its terms refers to the collection of debts owed to “another,” it follows, the Court held, that the definition does not include those who collect debts for themselves.

The petitioners’ primary argument against this conclusion was that the second definition uses the word “owed” in the past tense.  Thus, according to the petitioners, a subsequent purchaser of a debt that was at one time “owed” to “another,” namely, the originating lender, would qualify as a “debt collector.”  The Court rejected this argument, noting that the word “owed” could easily be understood in the present tense, and, in any event, construing it in the past tense would be difficult to square with the nearby word “due” (“owed or due . . . another”), which indisputably is used in the present tense.

The Court then addressed the exclusion, alluded to above, removing from the definition “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due . . . another to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii).  The Court rejected the petitioners’ suggestion that by excluding a person collecting a debt that “was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person,” the definition of “debt collector” impliedly included a person collecting a debt that was in default “at the time it was obtained by such person” (which allegedly was the case with the debts at issue here).

The Court concluded, first, that the term “obtained” in this exclusion does not mean “purchased,” but rather having taken “possession” of a debt “for servicing and collection.”  Second, the Court concluded that since the exclusion removes persons from the scope of the term “debt collector” who would otherwise fall within it, the exclusion does even not apply unless the person at issue does indeed satisfy the initial definition.  In other words, a person must, as a threshold, “attempt to collect debts owed another” in order for the logically secondary question to arise as to whether that person is within the terms of the exclusion.  The Court observed that the “petitioners’ argument simply does not fully confront this plain and implacable textual prerequisite.”

Although it is now clear that a party seeking to collect a debt for its own account (even when it acquired the debt after it had already gone into default) cannot be a “debt collector” under the second of the two definitions in the FDCPA, by declining to address the first definition, the Court in Henson left open the possibility that a party collecting  for its own account might still qualify as a debt collector if it is “in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).  Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit, after concluding, like the Supreme Court in Henson, that the second definition excludes parties collecting debts for their own accounts, expressly acknowledged that such a party might nevertheless be a debt collector under the first definition if its “‘principal purpose’ is the collection of ‘any debts.’”  Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309, 1316 n.8 (11th Cir. 2015).

There are comparatively few decisions analyzing the first definition, but that presumably will change in the wake of Henson, as plaintiffs, and their lawyers, seek to make use of this still potentially open path to attempt to establish that a debt owner is a “debt collector.”  Parties that purchase and collect debts for their own accounts should pay close attention as this issue evolves.  This blog will track and report on significant developments.

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Puts Creditors on Notice of Rulemaking Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

By Edward J. Sholinsky

Last week, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a news release and Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that signals the Bureau’s intention to broadly exercise its claimed power under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to regulate creditors and debt collectors.  Most notably, the Bureau is claiming the power to regulate creditors.  Although creditors generally are exempted from liability under the Act, the 113-page Notice touches on nearly every aspect of debt collection under the Act, seeking comments on a wide variety of topics from traditional written notices to how contemporary communication technology – like social media, text messaging, and cell phones – affect debt collection practices.

Even while acknowledging that Congress specifically excluded creditors from the Act’s reach, the Bureau stated that it “believes it is important to examine whether rules covering the conduct of creditors . . . are warranted,” citing the Dodd-Frank Act as its authority for doing so.  The Bureau’s potential reach here is staggering and could impact creditors, like retailers, medical providers, and small business, which would not likely have considered themselves subject to the Bureau’s jurisdiction or the Act itself. The Bureau signaled earlier this fall that it wished to expand its reach when it claimed supervisory authority over any furnisher of information to credit agencies under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  We discussed that bulletin in an earlier blog post.  This Notice seems to be the next step in the Bureau’s broad claim to jurisdiction over consumer creditors.

While far ranging, the Notice focuses specific attention on the adequacy of information that creditors provide to collectors and buyers of debts, and how creditors transmit that information.  The questions posed by the Bureau suggest that it is contemplating rules governing how creditors provide information to debt collectors and buyers when assigning or selling a debt and the oversight creditors have over the collection of the sold or assigned debt.  Additionally, the Bureau dedicated a section of the Notice to technology that both creditors and debt collectors and buyers can use to share information, and privacy concerns relating to that technology.

This Notice is the second signal since September that the Bureau is looking to expand its purview in the area of debt collection to creditors, who generally are considered to be outside of the reach of federal debt collection laws.

The Third Circuit holds that communications with debtors during bankruptcy proceedings can expose debt collectors to liability under the FDCPA

By Stephen J. Shapiro

The Third Circuit, addressing an issue of first impression in the circuit, recently held that debtors who receive communications from debt collectors in the course of bankruptcy proceedings are not barred from pursuing claims alleging that those communications violate the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA).  In Simon v. FIA Card Services, N.A., the plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy and FIA, one of their unsecured creditors, hired a law firm to represent its interests in the bankruptcy proceeding.  The law firm sent a letter to the Simons’ bankruptcy counsel in which it offered to refrain from initiating a proceeding to declare the debt nondischargeable if the Simons either stipulated that the debt was nondischargeable or agreed to settle the debt by paying a discounted amount.  The letter also enclosed a notice of the law firm’s intent to question the plaintiffs pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004.

The Simons sued FIA and the law firm, arguing that the letter and notice violated the FDCPA.  The district court dismissed the suit because, it held, the Bankruptcy Code precluded the Simons’ FDCPA claims and because the Simons’ allegations were not sufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA.

The Third Circuit reversed.  First, the Court rejected the law firm’s argument that the FDCPA did not apply because the firm’s communication did not demand payment of a debt.  The Court held that the “FDCPA applies to litigation-related activities that do not include an explicit demand for payment when the general purpose is to collect payment,” and that “[t]he letter and notice were an attempt to collect the Simons’ debt through the alternatives of settlement . . . or gathering information to challenge dischargeability” through a Rule 2004 examination.

Next, the Court held that some of the Simons’ allegations stated viable claims for violations of the FDCPA.  Specifically, the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from “threat[ening] to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken” and “false[ly] represent[ing] or impl[ying] that documents are legal process.”  The Court held that the Simons adequately pled that the law firm violated these prohibitions in the FDCPA by failing to comply with provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules and Federal Rules that required the firm to: (a) personally serve the Rule 2004 notice on the Simons, and (b) include in the Rule 2004 notice text explaining the duties of and remedies available to the recipient of such a notice.  The Simons also alleged that the law firm failed to include in its letter the “mini-Miranda” warning required by the FDCPA (that “the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose”).

The Court then addressed an issue of first impression in the Third Circuit: “[W]hether, or to what extent, an FDCPA claim can arise from a debt collector’s communications to a debtor in a pending bankruptcy proceeding.”  The Court first noted that the circuits are split on this issue.  The Ninth Circuit, Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the Second Circuit have held that communications with a debtor in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding cannot violate the FDCPA, while the Seventh Circuit has concluded that they can.  The Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, and held that “[w]hen FDCPA claims arise from communications a debt collector sends a bankruptcy debtor in a pending bankruptcy proceeding . . . there is no categorical preclusion of the FDCPA claims.”  Rather, the courts must consider “whether the FDCPA claim raises a direct conflict between the [Bankruptcy] Code or [Federal] Rules and the FDCPA, or whether both can be enforced.”

Applying that inquiry to the claims before it, the Court held that the Simons’ FDCPA claims based on the law firm’s failure to personally serve the Rule 2004 notice and failure to include in the notice text describing the rights and responsibilities of the recipient did not conflict with the Bankruptcy Code or the Federal Rules and, therefore, reversed the dismissal of those claims.  However, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the FDCPA claim based on the law firm’s failure to include in its letter a warning that it was attempting to collect a debt because such a warning would have violated the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision, which forbids “any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor . . . .”

The lesson for debt collectors in the Simon case is clear.  When communicating with a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding, debt collectors must take the same care to comply with the FDCPA as they would when communicating with debtors outside of bankruptcy proceedings.

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